20c JUNE 22, 1953

IS TAFT RIGHT ABOUT THE UN?

# New Republic




## Malenkov's Hundred Days

*How United Is the New Regime?*

## Trojan Horse For Sale

*The Kremlin Prepares to Dump Middle East Communist Parties*

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JUN 19 1953

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# From Our Readers

### Liberal Conformism

● . . . In the course of my weekly readings, I have noticed many things upsetting to me without ever thinking it necessary to dash off a hasty letter. On top of these disaffections, however, the proximate cause of my objections came along in the three letters commenting on the Jung review (*NR*, June 8).

First, let me say that I dislike Jung and all he stands for in his field, so I am not arguing from personal bias. However, I also dislike Freud, here differing from your three readers who deify him. Second, I am a liberal and a Catholic, a position utterly incomprehensible both to the *NR* and to your readers, who thus display only their ignorance. Have they never read *Commonweal* or *America?* Have they never heard of the Social Encyclicals? Apparently not, for they still plunge happily head first into the old "liberal" error, which probably has harmed the modern world more than any other, of equating their conception of "freedom" with lack of any external restraints whatsoever.

The chief point to be noticed in all three letters is simply this: these people are all upset because you dared print something contrary to their beliefs! How dare Allen Tate imply Catholicism is the truth! How dare Kathleen Raine set Jung higher than Freud! Your readers do not agree, therefore, they should be thrown out so that your journal can become a magazine of "liberal" opinion. I may indeed be quite naïve, but my thought has always been that while a reactionary is unwilling to welcome or even tolerate any but his own ideas, a liberal is willing to welcome all ideas and points of view. E. K. says ". . . in the market-place of opinion, the truth will prove stronger than error." What truth? His truth, naturally, since he will not permit "dogma" to "rear its ugly head" if *he* had *his* way! Mercy, he sounds just like Senator Taft! Or, is he afraid to acknowledge that Catholicism might indeed be the truth and thus shall win out over error?

. . . If the *New Republic*, which is doctrinaire in its political pages, ever rated books or reviewers in terms of their adherence to an "orthodox liberalism," its worth would be gone. Can't the readers of *NR* see any resemblance in their condemnation of Jung, Tate, Raine, etc., *a priori* because they hold different views, with the current Congressional condemnations of Wechsler, Oxnam, etc., simply because they hold different views?

The liberal must accept the consequences of his position, namely, a toleration of all opinion, or abandon his position and do away with sham names. There is not only one truth in government or politics, a fact which the Church has long recognized. And since these people are not concerned with religion, they need not worry about the one truth in religion. Why, therefore, are they so upset at differences in opinion?

*Washington, D. C.* JUDITH M. FREEDMAN

### Small Hospitals

● We feel that your editorial entitled "No Unnecessary Surgery?" is incomplete in some respects. We do not wish to engage in any debate on your main theme except to say that there is another viewpoint which has not been expressed in your columns.

In the body of your editorial you state that there are 1,000 proprietary hospitals privately owned by one or two doctors and go on to imply that since they are not inspected by the American College of Surgeons, the medical practice is of low grade. Many of these institutions have requested inspection and standardization by the American College of Surgeons. Such supervision has never been forthcoming from the College or any other similar organization. We feel that this type of institution fills a very important place in American medicine and can give the finest type of medical care considering the resources available to it. In many large institutions it is now the objective to have one physician supervise medical treatment of a patient during all phases of illness, both in hospital and clinic. This is already achieved in a small institution that we are discussing. Personal care such a patient receives, can hardly be duplicated anywhere. It is in these small institutions that the tradition of the family physician is being maintained in all its finest aspects. It is also noteworthy that the economic burden to the public is at a minimum under such conditions. In answer to the criticism of tissue examinations, advanced technical facilities may not be available in the small hospital, but these are not necessary when patients can be referred to larger centers for specialistic treatment. Some of these institutions already have tissue examinations voluntarily made on all their surgical specimens.

For these reasons, we believe the elimination of the small hospital would be a definite loss to the practice of medicine in this country.

*Bryant, S. D.* BRYANT CLINIC

### Community Betterment?

● I presume that the following is typical of America 1953 and is being repeated every day wherever citizens get together for a public purpose?

The place is our neighborhood high school auditorium; the purpose of the meeting is to discuss community betterment—juvenile delinquency, better police protection and street lighting for our neighborhood, etc. The speakers are business and professional men from the community and, of course, property owners. All are concerned with "maintaining property values," and although it is not mentioned explicitly, they are concerned with the "purity" of a community that is already pretty mixed and now facing the horror of Negro infiltration.

Do we meet, listen to the speakers, participate in the discussion and agree on steps to be taken? Not much. First the high-school orchestra is there to strike

*(Continued on page 4)*

# To Our Readers

● Our attempts to get the *New Republic's* story of the *Financial Affairs of McCarthy* onto the newsstands of the country were unsuccessful. We were told by the distributors that there was too little general interest in this report and that distribution on the newsstands would therefore be financially unprofitable. We weren't convinced, however, that the professional magazine distributors were right and our skepticism seems to have been justified by what happened.

Out of our own Washington office we have to date sold more than 150,000 copies of this Congressional document, which extraordinary response seems to prove once more that people want the truth.

* * *

Perhaps you missed this story, printed in Leonard Lyons syndicated column, about our editorial director:

At the Lasker Awards luncheon Bruce Bliven, of the *New Republic,* sat between three magazine editors. The first, from *Woman's Home Companion,* told him: "I like your Yale medical school piece in our upcoming issue." . . . "Thanks," said Bliven, "but my son, Bruce Bliven Jr., wrote it." . . . "Oh, of course," said the editor. "I understand his new book, *Preview for Tomorrow,* is good." . . . "Thanks, but my son didn't write the book," said Bliven. "I did."

Then the second editor, from *Redbook,* spoke up: "Nice piece you did for us, on souvenir weapons." . . . Bliven said it was his son's article. "That's right," said the editor. "He did another one for us, about the psychology of Communism." . . . "No," said Bliven. "I wrote that one." The third editor, from *Colliers,* said: "I'm not going to get tripped up. I'll play it safe and just say that one of you had a piece in our issue a couple of weeks ago." . . . "That wasn't by either of us," said Bliven. "It was your editorial, attacking me for my piece in the *Saturday Evening Post.*"

*M. S.*

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New Republic



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## WASHINGTON WIRE

IKE'S ANTI-BOOK burning speech at Dartmouth sounded fine. But who is burning the books? Why, the State Department in its Foreign Information Service libraries around the globe is black-listing US authors. An order to stop this would have been even more eloquent than Ike's Dartmouth speech.

America's position in Europe is sadly weakening; that summarizes scores of recent dispatches. Executive instability in France and Italy reflects the same kind of disease of democracy of which there are some symptoms in Washington. Moscow has, meanwhile, taken away the diplomatic initiative from Dulles. At home, Congress has shown that the slogan "trade not aid" is not much more than a slogan, while reckless statements of individual Congressmen reduce the benefits of Eisenhower foreign aid (cut $2 billion below Truman recommendations). Above all, American prestige has plummeted with Europe's increasing by frightened comparison of McCarthyism to early stages of its own Fascism and Hitlerism. What really did the trick, many feel, was the fantastic Cohn & Schine visit. That bizarre, unbelievable episode convinced half Europe that America has gone crazy.

**About the only** thing to point out this week in regard to the Korean truce talks is that Eisenhower has accepted the Truman-Acheson "peace-without-victory" policy and that this is now supported by Republicans who would have impeached Acheson for proposing it. Indeed, it is difficult to believe the GOP (in their former inflamed state) would have accepted any settlement negotiated by Democrats. In fairness to Columnist David Lawrence and the Hearst-McCormick press, who still bloodthirstily oppose Ike's truce, they are consistent with the previous GOP stand. It is the Tafts and Knowlands who have shifted. In February, 1952, at Seattle, Taft savagely denounced Truman for trying to make peace in Korea "without victory."

**Taft, we are** sorry to report, is gravely ill. He has been the strongest political force in Washington and his misfortune is tragic. Taft's absence could bring collapse to Ike's whole shaky Congressional edifice. Knowland is a young, well-meaning noodle-head, Saltonstall a fine but ineffective Marquand Yankee blueblood so fearful of defeat next year he begs McCarthy to aid him, Dirksen comes straight out of the Chicago *Tribune* drawer of overset, Millikin is a straightforward, likeable corporation lawyer; the lot of them lack half Taft's drive and prestige.

Testy Old Guarders like Ways and Means Chairman Dan Reed have taken Ike's measure and regard him contemptuously. Last week at Mt. Rushmore, N.D., Ike's speech revealed the full, frightening determination to keep hands off Congress and not to fight for leadership as his advisers have implored. He disclosed a copybook interpretation of "separation of powers" that is as sentimentally unrealistic as some grammar school texts. With Taft out and Ike unwilling to fight, the Reeds take over.

Ike was happy over his Batten-Barton-Durstine & Osborn TV show and will repeat it, with a new gadget. Next time, according to plans, the charts which the four self-conscious Cabinet members held will be *animated* so there will be a slick insert movie routine with cute little men, visualizing debt, taxes, surpluses and the like.

Some of Columnist Lippmann's recent pieces seem directed straight at Ike; back in France Ike used to read Lippmann in the Paris edition of the NY *Herald-Tribune*. Lippmann has implored Ike not to repeat ex-General Grant's Presidential mistake in keeping hands off Congress. Ike has "become separated," Lippmann says plaintively, "from the

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real sources of his strength." Heaven knows if Ike has time to read any columnists now in days so crowded with cabinet meetings, international crises, golf and trout fishing. Under dateline, "Custer State Park, June 12," the *United Press* reported: "President Eisenhower went fishing today after warning Republicans they must 'work like dogs in the future' to kill 'creeping Socialism' pushed by Democrats." The local headline was, "Ike Still Fishing."

Methodist Bishop Oxnam, Robert Hutchins, ex-Harvard President Conant, the NY *Times*—these four and others have all recently been attacked in various witch-hunts. Dr. Conant, High Commissioner, attended a farewell party for Theodore Kaghan at Bonn, after the latter was forced to resign under McCarthy pressure. The State Department is now asking those known to be present at the party to tell the names of others present. Meanwhile McCarthy's curious assistant, Harvey Matusow, has been detailed to investigate the New York press, following his charge that "over 100 Communists" are working for the New York *Times*.

We were told the other day that McCarthy investigator Matusow was a "psychoceramic." "And what is that?" we inquired in alarm. "Just a crack-pot," said our friend airily.

As an illustration of technical competence in narrow range we recall a kitchen helper who acquired proficiency in two specialties. She could bake excellent sweet potato pies and prepare radish rosettes. Valuable as these skills were the family finally tired of them. But the maid could not read, and aside from her twin accomplishments she was lost in the kitchen. We are reminded of her every time we hear Chairman Reed (the Syngman Rhee of the Ways & Means Committee) croak "Cut taxes!" Chairman Reed couldn't prepare a full legislative meal, but he does know how to make lovely radish rosettes.

**Notes:** Steel companies are passing costs of pay boosts on to buyers; does this mean inflation? No, say economists, supply is overtaking demand and labor will have tougher times in future. . . . *Washington* T.R.B.

## LETTERS

*(Continued from page 2)*

up the *Star Spangled Banner* (everybody rises and sings). Before we have a chance to rest our feet a group of wooden-faced young robots from the school R.O.T.C. go through an elaborate ceremony of "fixing the flag" while all stand rigidly at attention. Next we all recite the "Oath of Allegiance" and sing *America*.

Are we finally ready to get down to the business of the evening? Oh no; Someone sits down to a piano and a song leader pops up to get his audience in the mood by leading us in singing popular ballads.

The first speaker, an apparently intelligent woman, speaks in generalities. She is followed by a Lutheran minister who uses five of his allotted 10 minutes to inform us that our souls are at least as important as the problems we are gathered to discuss, and the other five in generalities. Then the president rises to speak. He is a local attorney, and he reads at length from an article recently published in the neighborhood newspaper and outlining the objectives of this citizen organization—more generalities. Next the district superintendent of schools to tell us that we need not worry because our children can't spell and are almost total strangers to the three R's—they will be alright because they are learning to live and get along with their fellows, and therefore growing up without inhibitions. Finally we are treated to a 10 minute oration by the valedictorian of the June graduating class—no doubt a promising young man who will grow up to be a good lawyer or politician. . . .

If this is America 1953 when a hundred or two citizens try to get together for an earnest discussion of common problems, then perhaps Orwell's fantastic look into the year 1984 is not so fantastic after all!
*Chicago, Ill.* H. C. RYAN

### Hypocritical Oath

On tonight's Groucho Marx radio show a question was asked, with a $2,500 prize depending. The question was: "What oath, written by a Greek physician 2500 years ago, is taken by physicians today? The answer given was: "The Hypocritical oath." Groucho said "right." The audience broke into applause, the show came to an end, and I was left to wonder: Had anyone intended a joke, or had anyone noticed one?
*Monrovia, Calif.* UPTON SINCLAIR

### A.D.A. Workshop

● Some of your readers may be interested in the July 11-19 fourth annual Summer Workshop on practical politics which Americans for Democratic Action has planned. Speakers include Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Congressman Charles Howell, Robert R. Nathan, and Joseph L. Rauh Jr. Place: Bard College, two hours by train from New York City.

Liberals, whether ADA members or not, are welcome. For further information, please write the undersigned.
*Washington, D. C.* DAVID C. WILLIAMS

### Senator Morse

● It seems to me that McCarthy is getting more attention than he deserves from the liberal papers. Why doesn't someone give some publicity to a man who is doing something positive and constructive? I mean Wayne Morse. He has been pushed around by both parties, and he is practically ignored by the regular daily press. . . .

Senator Morse is fighting our battle, and the least we could do for him is to bring him before the public in a favorable light. . . .
*Philadelphia, Pa.* RUTH A. VOLLMER

## Bandwagon

In the stormiest session of its 62nd convention, the General Federation of Women's Clubs yesterday voted down a resolution endorsing President Eisenhower's plan to admit 240,000 displaced persons to this country. . . .

One delegate trumpeted: "We mustn't forget these people are not subject to birth control. The 240,000 will soon be one million." – *From the Washington* Post.

* * *

Whether any Boston school teacher or other department personnel refused to take the new voluntary anti-Communist oath will not be known for a week, Supt. Dennis C. Haley said last night.

If any teacher or other employee refused to take the oath, which is purely voluntary, the School Committee must then decide whether any action is to be taken. – *From the Boston* Daily Globe.

* * *

Taft's views on the United Nations drew guarded comments in Washington. . . . Said Senator Smith (R, N.J.): "This is such an important matter I'm not going to say anything." – *From the* Wall Street Journal.

* * *

The attack against the United Nations was made by Mrs. Bruce D. Reynolds of Charlottesville, Va., national defense chairman, who said that the D.A.R. almost single-handedly "fought the United Nations war in Korea until popular demand forced the training of Republic of Korea forces to relieve Americans who constitute 90 percent of the United Nations ground forces." – *From the New York* Times.

**Our readers are invited to contribute; $2 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, c/o New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – The Editors.**

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New Republic

# IS THE UNITED NATIONS EXPENDABLE?

TAFT'S CINCINNATI speech—his last as Majority Leader—was damned on all sides as a reversion to isolationism. The editorial writers of the nation raised reproving fingers. The Senate muttered "most unfortunate!" The President answered it with noble sentiments about all for one and one for all. Taft's speech, to be sure, was poorly phrased and miserably timed. It still deserved better treatment.

Taft did not attack the United Nations. He simply reiterated his conviction that, as it is constructed today, the United Nations is constitutionally incapable of collective action. He declared:

> I believe in the United Nations but not as an effective means to prevent aggression. It does have many methods by which, through peaceful persuasion it can deter and prevent war. It has important agencies which are concerned with the improvement of conditions throughout the world. But as far as the prevention of aggression is concerned, it might as well be forgotten for the present.

These views cannot be dismissed by men for whom the UN takes the place of a comma in a peroration. Nor are they answered in any sense by Eisenhower's protestation that the United Nations is a fine thing. For Taft was speaking at the level of political science, not public relations, and a counter-plan must be drafted by the firm of Humphrey, Wilson, Dulles and Dodge before the firm of Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn can stage a counter-script.

Many internationalists, from Walter Lippmann to the World Federalists, will endorse Taft's diagnosis, and millions of Americans share his sense of frustration with the UN. His weakness was not in his diagnosis but in his inability to suggest any practicable cure.

It would be more helpful today if Taft turned his intellect to bear on the real dangers and choices that confront the UN. In this task Taft could not do better than to review the downfall of the League of Nations which he supported as a young man; and to reflect on its lessons for today.

* * *

The League of Nations, like the UN, was an effort to place the relations of states on a juridical and contractual basis. To succeed, the League needed the wholehearted support of its member states. But while they paid lip service to the League, the member states set out, at the war's end, to restore and maintain, through shifting alliances, a new and precarious balance of power. The League Assembly adopted the Geneva Protocol which, it assumed, banned war for all time. At the same moment, Lord Cecil noted, the British Foreign Office, like the Quai D'Orsay, entirely ignored the League and in fact regarded it "as a kind of excrescence."

**Today it is customary** to conclude that the foreign offices were right, and the League enthusiasts guilty of a universalist heresy. But, regardless of who was right and wrong, the duality was dangerous. At the level of contracts there were the Kellogg Pact and the disarmament conferences; at the level of national pressures there were developing the *revanchism* of the beaten states, the ambitions of the frustrated states, the lethargy of the satisfied states, and the strength of two little considered outsiders, the US and the USSR.

Thirteen years after the League was founded the disparity between principles and pressures reached its breaking point. Japan tore up the Covenant in invading Manchuria, and before the League Assembly Sir John Simon presented Japan's brief, leaving Mr. Matsuoka nothing to say. However, Japan departed from the League and Hitler followed. Mussolini, whose spokesman first voted to condemn Hitler's defiance of the Versailles Treaty, invaded Ethiopia within six months of Germany's successful violation of the Covenant.

Mussolini assumed the League would further retreat under guidance of the foreign offices. Instead the imponderable force of public opinion asserted itself, and the League came to life. Fifty nations joined to apply sanctions against Italy. But sanctions were included to deter rather than to halt aggression, and in the second capacity they were ineffective. While Britain pressed Stanley Baldwin to strengthen the collective-security system, Pierre Laval betrayed it in the name of France. Then Chamberlain placed Britain behind Laval, starting the chain reaction that was the immediate cause of World War II. Swollen ambition was incited in Berlin; Poland drew closer to Germany; Yugoslavia signed an agreement with Mussolini; the Little Entente was wrecked; the Franco-Soviet Pact became a dead letter; Czechoslovakia was isolated; the Axis was formed; Chamberlain renounced "the imposition of sanctions and

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the use of force" by the League; Germany took that as an invitation to invade Austria; the small nations rushed to seek refuge in neutrality; Hitler moved against Prague; Chamberlain responded with the Munich Pact. So the road down which Hitler's divisions rolled to war was paved by the democracies.

In all this, Chamberlain was motivated not so much by hatred of Stalin or sympathy for Hitler as by the belief that if sanctions led to war Britain would be left carrying the whole burden for the League—Chamberlain and his party were unwilling to risk bearing any such burden. And Europeans silently agreed, as Lord Lothian noted in 1937, that "no nation will in practice incur the terrific risks and costs of modern war except where its own vital interests are involved."

"The dream of 1918," Lothian concluded, "has now disappeared beyond recall," a phrase Taft might apply in 1953 to the vision of 1945.

**Two conflicting doctrines** of collective security and universalism divide the UN today, in the light of the UN's record in Korea. Precisely the same debate divided the League after its inadequate effort to defeat Italy. The supporters of collective security proposed to strengthen the system of sanctions that the League would enforce against the Fascist nations; the opponents, to bring Germany, Italy and Japan back into a League shorn of Enforcement Powers.

It was too late, of course, for reform. One man who understood this was Winston Churchill. He despised romantic abstractions, but he backed the League as it existed, firm in the simple belief that it was a useful instrument for the defense of the status quo.

So the effort to cite the Covenant when it was convenient and to scorn it when it was inconvenient left the West with no alliances to maintain peace, and no League to give its universal purpose to the war that became inevitable. An acute French historian, Marcel Hoden, concluded:

> Resistance to aggression by the dictators required the existence of an international ideology and the resolute will of those who accepted it to defend it. Such an ideology did in fact exist in the Covenant of the League.
>
> But . . . after having allowed the League, their best instrument for action, to be smashed under their very eyes, they began striving to revise an international conscience. Would it not have been better to have enforced the Covenant in the first place? Much that was of value spiritually would have been saved as well as much that was worth saving materially.

There is, of course, little in common between 1937 and 1953. War is not the preferred method of Communist expansion. Appeasement is not the motive of those who direct the current drive to disengage the US from the UN. But the pressures are the same and the results may be the same, in driving the small nations to neutrality, the great nations to a spirit of *sauve qui peut*, and the Communist nations to a willingness to risk aggression. And in the light of these dangers Hoden's warning is surely relevant today.

It is easy, too easy, to scorn a world organization whose Security Council offers Russia a veto power, and whose Assembly provides one vote apiece for Luxembourg and the United States. The fact remains that a way has been found to bypass the veto in the Assembly and that, further, the opinions of the small nations serve as a useful check on the tendency of great powers to equate their self-interest with universal and eternal laws. Beyond this, the deep-felt faith of millions of people in many lands in the United Nations is too precious an asset to be roughly handled or lightly thrown away. It may be that regional pacts are necessary to bolster the UN. But the fact remains that many independent nations will not join military alliances outside the UN. And yet these nations may be decisive in the balance between the Communist and the democratic countries. They owe a real allegiance to the UN, and if the UN serves simply as the highest common denominator of the non-Communist nations, it may save world peace.

Of course, collective security worked imperfectly in Korea. But internal problems, and not the imperfections of the Charter, prevent Yugoslavia, India and other nations from manning the Korean front. We may distrust a system which permits nations to vote a course of common action when they have no present intention of carrying it out. But we cannot cast aside the UN for all time because in its earliest years its members are too unaware of their duties, or too hard-pressed by domestic difficulties, to carry their share of collective resistance.

**The UN may prove** invaluable as a meeting ground between the West and Asia rather than between the West and Russia. Precisely for this reason we must study the very real difference in approach of Asia and the West toward the UN. For the Asian nations believe in the UN primarily as an instrument of mediation; the West holds that the forcible repression of aggression is the heart of the Charter. There is much to be said for each of these attitudes and they dictate a conflict in approach to the seating of Communist China that may divide the free world.

No time can be lost in determining what is best for the US and peace. So please, Mr. President, lead the country during critical months. Let the trout frolic in the stream and the divots grow back on the fairways, the soap salesmen concentrate on soap and the ancient clichés rest in peace.

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# THE WEEK

## POSTPONING JUDGMENT DAY

The Supreme Court has postponed its decision on the constitutionality of segregating public schools as between white and colored students. It has ordered reargument next October 12 on this far-reaching issue, thereby making it likely that the decision will not be forthcoming until some time in 1954.

This postponement reflects serious uncertainties on the part of at least a majority of the nine Justices. In requesting that the lawyers address themselves particularly to certain specified questions at the argument, the Justices revealed two major concerns: (1) whether, in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment in the years 1866 to 1868, Congress and the state legislatures and conventions contemplated that the Amendment might somehow result in outlawing public-school segregation; (2) if such segregation is held unconstitutional, how definite the Court should be at this time in spelling out the methods of erasing the patterns of segregation.

The first concern is a problem of historical research. To date that research has uncovered little if any evidence that school segregation as we know it was practiced in 1866-1868, much less that it was an evil within the contemplation of those responsible for the Amendment. The Court is entitled to whatever enlightenment further research may bring; and it would be most helpful if that research could be conducted by the best qualified historians in the country. But even if the conclusion is reached that segregated schools were not a problem on the 1866 horizon, the answer would not be conclusive. The major issue then remains whether segregation is compatible with the general principles laid down in the Fourteenth Amendment, principles which time and again have been applied to situations outside the original anticipation of the Amendment. Therein lies the challenge to the Court. That it is fully aware of that challenge is evident from the time-consuming care with which it is dealing with the issue and from the nature of the questions it has asked as to how it could most effectively order the elimination of segregation.

## TAFT TO KNOWLAND?

In designating W. F. Knowland (Cal.) acting majority leader of the Senate for the remainder of this Congress, Senator Taft has not actually stepped down as head of his party in Congress. So long as he is physically able to attend the sessions of the Senate and the policy meetings with the President, Taft will continue to have the determining voice and Senator Knowland will merely be called upon to carry out Taft's policies. But should the medical treatment prescribed for Taft prevent his staying on the job regularly, Eisenhower can anticipate increased difficulty in getting united support from the Republicans in Congress.

Knowland, like Taft, disagrees with the President on many issues. But like Taft, Knowland is basically a team player and, as indicated by his recent change from supporting Rhee's position to backing the Eisenhower truce proposal in Korea, is capable of drastic shifts in the face of a party emergency. But Taft, with his greater seniority and with the wide respect his character and intelligence command, even from those who dislike him, has found it hard to deliver the votes Eisenhower needs on all occasions and Knowland will find it yet harder.

There are 12 Senators generally regarded as "Taftmen" and 11 others as "Ikemen" around whom Taft could always build a combination. Knowland has no similar body of personal support and no notable talent for making friends. The probability is that the restless GOP coalition in the Senate which Taft and Eisenhower between them have been able to preserve, will become far shakier if Knowland is called upon to assume the full responsibilities of leadership.

## "LOST LAWS" ENFORCED

With one unanimous decision, the Supreme Court opened every eating place in Washington to colored persons and established the capital's right to as much self-government as states and territories.

This was accomplished when the Court found "presently enforceable" a law passed in 1873 by the Legislative Assembly which ruled the District briefly after the Civil War.

"The lost laws," as the 1873 statute and one passed in 1872 were known, both provided that an eating-place proprietor had to serve "any respectable, well-behaved person" regardless of color, or face a $100 fine and forfeiture of his license for one year. Both laws "disappeared" around 1901, when they were dropped without explanation from a compilation of the District Code. Several persons claim the honor, now, of their rediscovery. But the legal arguments, demonstrating the laws were still in force, were first presented in a brief prepared by the National Lawyers Guild and submitted to the District Commissioners in 1949.

The Commissioners were still studying the laws in 1950, when three colored persons and one white forced the issue by entering a Thompson restaurant and requesting service under the old statutes. Thompson's refusal launched a test case. Considering the bitter differences of opinion the laws evoked from judges in the lower courts, the Supreme Court's unanimity is remarkable.

Besides opening restaurants, the opinion gives the District home-rule cause a boost. Once and for all it knocks out the idea that Congress can only delegate limited power to the District—a notion that has seriously hampered the creation of a really workable home rule bill. Despite the fact that the case originated long before January 20, 1953, and was not argued before the court by any of the new administration lawyers, President Eisenhower was quick to claim political credit for this "forward movement."

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## DE GASPERI — TOO MANY HELPERS

ROME, (*NR Corresp.*)

THE RESULT of the Italian election in terms of the practical possibilities now available in domestic politics is that Alcide de Gasperi won a notable defeat —thanks in part to Mrs. Luce and to the Catholic Action organization. He won to the extent that his Christian Democratic Party will have a narrow majority in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate *if* its small party allies, the Democratic Socialists, the Liberals and the Republicans continue to maintain the alliance of the so-called Center; and *if* no factions within his party stray from the fold. But these two *ifs*, together or separately, can mean defeat for the personal control of the former librarian of the Vatican.

Many Italians who might have voted for the Christian Democrats shifted over to the smaller parties of the coalition, especially to the moderate Left represented by the Democratic Socialists, because they strongly resented Mrs. Luce's intervention in the campaign on behalf of what they saw as a link between US big business and Italian clericalism. Other Italians who would surely have voted for the neo-Fascist MSI or the Monarchists, chose the Christian Democrats because the Roman Catholic Church, especially the Catholic Action of Dr. Luigi Gedda and Father Lombardi, practically ordered them to.

**Premier de Gasperi** can therefore use his majorities in both houses of parliament only by making concessions to the moderate Left in the Center coalition. And the more he makes them the more will he be forced to placate the Right elements in his own party. If he fails to concede, the Democratic Socialists can conceivably defeat him on major domestic issues of economic reform and social justice by making (temporarily) common cause with the Nenni Socialists and the Communists. But if he fails to placate, the reactionaries in his own camp may join on international issues with the Monarcho-neo-Fascists — and this possibility is both more likely and more dangerous for Italy's continued support of US European and world policy.

A number of factors, national and international, psychological and economic, have contributed to make Italy's political future almost as uncertain of stability as France's. One of these is of de Gasperi's own making. He failed to realize that the method of "legal illegality" or "illegal legality" invented by the Fascists as a means of defeating democracy can not be adapted for use by the Christian Democrats with comparable efficiency in the defense of democracy against both Communism and neo-Fascism.

**The Fascists** "won" the crucial election of 1924 thanks to the Acerbo law of the previous year by which a political party polling more than 25 percent of the total vote was given an absolute majority. The recent electoral law, sponsored by de Gasperi personally, by which more than 50 percent of the total vote would have given his coalition 380 out of 590 seats in the Chamber, boomeranged against him. It smacked too much of the bad old days. And psychologically it did much more harm to the democratic cause than many of the affirmative arguments of the anti-democrats. So did other vote-gathering techniques to which the premier consented, if he did not connive in them. Here are a few examples:

Promises of political places to leaders and of preference to members of the three small parties of the Center, reinforcing the thesis that the Christian Democrats (though not the premier himself) after a long period in power are following Fascist examples of corruption;

Threats of national economic suicide in the event of the defeat of the Christian Democrats, made publicly by Mrs. Luce who warned that US aid might be withheld or even withdrawn;

Threats of personal spiritual suicide, made by prelates of the Church who warned against the dangers of mortal sin, excommunication, etc.;

The McCarthyish talk and tactics of some Christian Democratic leaders, notably the Sicilian Mario Scelba who, as Minister of the Interior, is a modernized amalgam of the most astute Bourbon "police politicians" and Napoleon's Fouché.

The stability of Christian Democratic rule and its steadily increasing submission to Church criteria in such matters as the family and social morals were supposed to present an appeal to the women voters. Of the total of 30.41 million voters, 52.41 percent or 15.9 million were women. The Church did everything possible to frighten them into support of the premier. The London *Times* notes that: "The intervention of the Church has been more direct than it was five years ago. On every side, the election was presented as a battle between the forces of light and darkness."

Yet there is no evidence that this appeal was much more effective with the women than with the men. On the contrary, though the proportion of women among the Communists is relatively low, it is high among the Monarchists and neo-Fascists. Apart from the general Church support for the *democristiani*—from Pope Pius himself to the most humble parish priests—not only in getting out the laical vote but also in "ordering" the vote of the large number of priests, monks, nuns and others under "rule," there was the special effort on behalf of de Gasperi of the Catholic Action, its "Christian militants," and its civic committees' organization.

**Since de Gasperi** was able to get the Democratic Socialists to put aside temporarily their internal squabbles and to join with him, the fact that the Nenni Socialists offered separate lists of candidates from the Communists for the first time was also thought to be an advantage. Instead, Pietro Nenni emerged at last as a major political figure in his own right —as the spokesman moreover for many of the Italians who, wanting the Churchillian Big-Four conference, seek a third road between Malenkov's Moscow and McCarthy's Washington.

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# FOR SALE: ONE TROJAN HORSE

by Ray Alan

STRONG hints are being passed around the Middle East nations that Malenkov may be about to discard what the West regards as Russia's most important arm of foreign policy. They have been dropped by Soviet representatives whose main task is the "cultivation" of significant local personalities and the imparting of "confidences" to those most likely to give them a wide word-of-mouth circulation.

**During the last** year of Stalin's life the Soviet representatives first suggested that "all this nonsense about Russia being a subversive influence" was so much Western propaganda. The Soviet Government, they would insist, was really quite disinclined to intervene in other people's affairs; it was only because of their own bad record in this respect, and in order to divert attention from their own warmongering and imperialistic activities, that the Western powers resorted repeatedly to this fiction. "First and foremost, the Soviet Union is a good neighbor and a good citizen in international society," Russia's lively envoy in Bagdad told a wealthy Arab friend of mine at a recent party. "Look at recent events in Persia and Egypt," he added. "Do you think the Persians and Egyptians needed Russian agents behind them to make them anti-British?"

During the same period Communists in the Arab states concentrated on nationalistic and peace-partisan agitation and gave no overt evidence of independent activities that might contradict the protestations of Soviet diplomats. Why should Great Russia tie herself to miserable bands of local malcontents when important elements are ready to look to Russia as a powerful, friendly state?

Since they re-emerged from the shells into which they shriveled up on the death of Stalin, Russian representatives in Cairo and Beirut have gone several steps beyond the merely negative "non-interventionist" line. It is now admitted, by implication, that viewed in the light of diplomatic orthodoxy the conduct of Russian policy may occasionally have appeared a little odd. But the days of ambiguity are over. The new regime in Moscow, say its spokesmen, is resolved to leave no loophole for misunderstanding between Russia and other nations on the ground of her alleged sponsorship of subversive activities. The rogue elephant is no longer needed to achieve Russia's objectives, and the rogue-elephant reputation shall be scotched. Discreetly, gradually—gently, perhaps, but none the less decisively—the Kremlin under Malenkov seems about to perform a heart-rending act of renunciation.

For 30 years Russian foreign policy has possessed a unique ally and potential fifth column in almost every country in the shape of a Moscow-oriented Communist Party—an instrument whose efficacy over-imaginative people in the West (including the Communist rank and file) tend to exaggerate but which may, in fact, have proved on balance to be of more embarrassment than worth to Moscow. It has poisoned Russia's diplomatic intercourse with the rest of the world, rendering normal relations with her impossible; it has scared off or offended well-wishers and potential allies far more valuable than any number of Communist sycophants; and in political low-pressure areas like the Near East it has resulted in Russia's being denied advantages that would have accrued to her by natural gravitation but for the Communist repellent. Through attempting to enjoy the best of both worlds—the imperialistic and the ideological—Stalin's Russia was, in the long run, frustrated in both.

Typical debit entries on the Kremlin's imperial account are, perhaps, those of two Arab leaders I know. After declaring publicly, as a reaction against some aspect of Western policy which displeased them, that their countries should seek an alliance with Russia, they admitted in private conversation that such a move was out of the question. Russia, they confessed, could not be trusted not to take advantage of it to encourage internal Arab forces that would imperil the whole feudal structure of the society whose spokesmen they were. "Now, if only Russia were a normal sort of power!" they sighed. These were the allies Russia might have won in the thirties, but lost instead to Germany. A wiser Russia notes that Germany is beginning to attract them again.

**One imagines that** equestrian acrobats who ride two horses at once, a foot on each, have a preconceived plan for emergencies: to this horse they will cling, if something goes wrong, while that one will be allowed to gallop its way unbridled until it can be brought to a halt. There was never any doubt about Stalin's intention of clinging to the traditionalist Great-Russian particularism with which he teamed up Leninist Communism around 1922. (It was in this year that he gave his approval to the brutal suppression of autonomism in the Ukraine and his own native Georgia. The dying Lenin's comment—delivered too late to prize Stalin's grip from the reins of power—was that Stalin should be held "politically responsible" for this "Great-Russian nationalist campaign

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of traditional type.") Trotsky would have ruined Russia for the sake of Communism; Stalin stood Marxism on its head and made monkeys of Communists everywhere to strengthen and safeguard his Russia. The sympathies of Trotskyite Socialists, Social Democrats, liberal fellow-travelers and finally Titoist Communists were successively scorned for Russia's national and imperial sake; and even Mao Tse-tung achieved victory in defiance of Stalin, whose stubborn preference for Chiang Kai-shek would have qualified him for founder-membership of Washington's China Lobby.

**Now, it is hinted,** the Communist steed is to be turned loose altogether. Presumably Mao can have it if he likes. This may be a candid admission on Malenkov's part that he has neither the agility nor the prestige required for a sustained repeat performance of his predecessor's acrobatics. Or it may mean that the new masters of the Kremlin are agreed that the Communist weapon backfires so often it harms Russia more than the democracies. A strong probability is that this is a limited, local maneuver to be tried out in the Near East where it stands the greatest chance of success. It may, like Stalin's dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, be half bluff, half appeasement, intended to reassure the Western powers; it may, indeed, be all bluff, a singularly stupid bluff that the Free World can quickly call.

But a hardening of the Great-Russian self-interest, on Stalinist lines, and a slackening of ideological ties—even a *sauve qui peut* attitude toward Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc—were logically to be expected on Stalin's demise. And what does seem clear is that Malenkov, the Muscovite bureaucrat fashioned by Stalin after his own image, and Mao Tse-tung, with his incomparably greater renown as revolutionary leader and theorist, embody the alternatives facing the Russo-Communist world shorn of Stalin in much the same way as did Stalin and Trotsky on the death of Lenin. The essential difference this time is that neither can liquidate the other; and since neither can carry the whole Communist empire with him the only possible outcome is a parting of ways. For some time, for security's sake, they will be obliged to go along together, using the editorial columns of *Pravda* and the Peking *People's Daily* to paper over the cracks as they appear; but a breach between them is as inevitable as was that between Stalin and Trotsky—and, personalities aside, on comparable ideological grounds.

* * *

Premature as it would be to conclude that a major modification of Russia's foreign-policy machinery is definitely under way, the hints dropped in Cairo and Beirut can do the West a service if only by warning it against the dangers of relapsing into over-rigid patterns of thought on Russian and Communist affairs.

If Malenkov does barter or abandon his Trojan horse, he will be doing so for the sake of Russia and his regime, not for love of the West. Malenkovism may well turn out to mean not a transformation of the Kremlin's policies, on new lines congenial to the free world, but the more efficient pursuit of traditional Russian aims—particularly in the Near East—where the freakish dualism of Stalinist strategy proved too cumbersome.

The Kremlin's support of Communist movements in the non-Communist world is essentially a long-term investment, recognized as such by Russian planners. Stalin was convinced that the Near East, for instance, would have to pass through a "bourgeois-nationalist" phase before becoming ripe for communization. (He held to this view despite the Communist victory in China, which he initially deplored because it proved Trotsky's analysis of the Chinese situation right and his own wrong.) As long ago as 1925 he lectured on the tactics whereby Marxist elements might gain control of the nationalist movements in Egypt and Morocco. But "bourgeois-nationalist" phase there had to be, in the first instance, and Communists must do nothing to try to short-circuit this natural development.

**At last,** the "bourgeois-nationalist" day has dawned in Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, and presumably cannot be far off in Iraq and Persia. Yet numerous factors not present in China are hampering the evolution of the Near Eastern masses, restless as they are, to a state in which they would respond to an internal Communist initiative. If the Russian leaders were quite confident that the Near East is likely to remain largely aloof from the Cold War, if their oil supplies were adequate, and if they had as profound and as trusting an affection for Communist dogma as is often supposed in the West, they would undoubtedly be content to sit tight and wait for events to take what in Marxist logic must be the inevitable course. The Near East is, after all, one of the areas of the world in which Russia's revolutionary aura gives her an advantage over the democracies in the minds of the illiterate masses and half-baked intelligentsia. But Malenkov obviously cannot be sure that Western strategic arrangements will not one day cover the Near East a good deal more effectively than at present. In addition Russia is chronically short of oil, and with the steady expansion of industry in Eastern Europe and China the Communist demand for oil is increasing faster than output in the Communist world. Finally the Kremlin's attitude toward Communist dogma is strictly pragmatical.

Malenkov may well, therefore, consider it advisable to take decisive diplomatic steps to strengthen neutralist

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tendencies at governmental level in the region and to earmark a share of Persian oil (now being marketed again from Abadan) for Russia and her allies. He would find it much easier than Western opinion might suppose to persuade Near-Eastern leaders, feudal and "bourgeois-nationalist" alike, to play ball if he could promise them a complete stoppage of aid and encouragement to troublesome elements in their territories. Such an undertaking would not be unprecedented. Stalin made an offer of this kind to British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin in 1947: his condition was that America be kept out of the Near East—a circumstance it was beyond the power of Bevin to guarantee.

* * *

In terms of power politics, a plain old-fashioned Russian imperialism, unadulterated with Communism, could be a greater nuisance in the Near East than the Stalinist variety. A renunciation by the Kremlin of its worn-out ideological arm would not necessarily signify the suppression of Russia's atavistic impulse toward the Persian Gulf. In 1940 Molotov told Hitler's ambassador, von Schulenberg, of Stalin's personal view that "the area south of Batum and Baku, in the general direction of the Persian Gulf," must be considered the "center of the Soviet Union territorial aspirations" in the Near East. Here was Soviet Czarism at its purest, stripped of all "Marxist-Leninist" pretensions. Malenkov may well be willing formally to tip the withered remnants of Marxism and Leninism overboard; but what of the "territorial aspirations?" Exactly 100 years ago the Czar Nicholas I made his second unsuccessful attempt to obtain Britain's agreement to a partition of the "sick" Ottoman Empire. His successor, Alexander II, subsequently annexed Kars, Ardahan and Batum. In recent years Stalin revived the Czarist claim to Kars and Ardahan which Lenin had handed back to the Turks as a gesture of good will. Today the Turks are wondering where Malenkov stands on this issue—with Lenin, or with Stalin and the Czars?

**It was common** in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the imperial powers to maintain footholds in the Near East by assuming—often uninvited—responsibility for the "protection" of one or more of the numerous religious and racial minorities in the Ottoman dominions. Thus France displayed a special interest in the Maronites and Catholics, Germany in the Protestants, Britain at various times in the Jews, Armenians and Druzes, and Russia in the Greek-Orthodox Christians. Stalin revived this practice, showing a distinct preference for dealing with communities rather than Communists. During the late 1940s good will toward Russia was built up on a communal basis, with notable success, among the Armenians, Greek-Orthodox Christians, Persian Azerbaijanis and Kurds. More recently nominally right-wing (though such terms mean little in this part of the world) Arab nationalists and certain Moslem obscurantists have shown signs of having been "cultivated." This type of selective trawling would obviously be facilitated, producing a far bigger catch were the Kremlin to cut loose from its present ideological moorings.

**The process of** "cultivation" is carried out by neither cloak-and-dagger nor even orthodox propagandist methods, but primarily by a dull, formal social routine in which subtle attention is paid to heads of communities and to bourgeois, capitalistic, landowning and genuinely religious elements who could in the Western world be expected to hold firmly anti-Soviet views, but who in the Near East respond to a surprising degree. Each group is, of course, told what it particularly wants to hear; while Russia is presented as the only great power genuinely sympathetic to the downtrodden and dispossessed. (These emotive words evoke a response in the most unlikely quarters: it is one of the characteristics of public life in most Near-Eastern countries that—quite apart from the minorities, who often have to endure appalling treatment, and frustrated intellectuals—any man on the fringes of the upper-class who does not have a brother or a cousin in a useful high office tends to regard himself as discriminated against and denied his natural rights.)

The new Russia has no interest in ideological crusades. "Ideological nonsense" and "We like to do business with businessmen, not with eccentrics" were among the phrases used by a Soviet commercial attaché in the Levant recently when a merchant I know, of aggressively right-wing views, asked him jokingly why he, a capitalist and unashamed "reactionary," rather than a Communist sympathizer, had for many years been favored with most of Russia's business in this country.

The ideological sympathizers, poor souls, have not been discouraged, of course, though they see the inside of their nearest Soviet legation far less frequently than many people they fondly imagine the Russians find obnoxious. But on numerous occasions the Russians have seemed eager to reveal their obvious contempt for their Communist or fellow-traveling "comrades"—as, for instance, when a particularly acrobatic apologist has crawled heroically, in defense of the Kremlin, to the end of a really perilous limb which has then been sawn off. (A recent victim of this type was Dr. Sneh of Israel's Mapam.) Malenkov may find it convenient to make increasing use of this technique from now on.

* * *

If the Russian dictator does relinquish his hold on international Communism, Mao Tse-tung and his col-

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leagues can be relied upon to take it over with gusto. In this event, the orthodox Communist parties of the West would almost certainly wither away, their members swelling the ranks of the Nenni-type and neutralist Socialists: in Italy and France this influx of recruits from the outer Left could make militant Socialism the dominant political force. But in Asia, and particularly in the Far East, Communism would receive a considerable boost: in countries such as India and Indonesia, where the Communists' Russian link is a liability, a Chinese connection would be an asset, for Red China's prestige is enormous. Nevertheless, the transfer of the center of gravity of the Communist world from Moscow to Peking should favor the West in hastening the end of effective collaboration and policy co-ordination between them.

Whether or not the hints dropped in Cairo and Beirut prove to be valid pointers to Malenkov's immediate intentions, Western policy-makers should be prepared, even this early in his tenure of office, to re-examine many of their basic notions about Stalinism, Chinese Communism, the aims of Russian foreign policy, and the Kremlin's relations with Chinese and satellite leaders, with a view to ascertaining how much of their thinking has roots in reality and how much in habit. They might ask themselves how the West ought to react to a slackening of ideological ties between Moscow and its minions. Should the democracies try to step into the breach, in Asia and Africa, and themselves take over the guidance and encouragement of reformist elements? Could we be friends with a Russia which, while refraining from encouraging subversive Communist activities outside its own borders, nevertheless remained a frozen mammoth of dictatorship in the same old imperialistic rut?

**An early essential** will be to redefine the free world's objectives in the Cold War, to insure that the democracies are all fighting not merely the same battle but the same opponent. Is the enemy Communism, as such? (Then, if so, what about Tito?) Is it Russian imperialism, even if Peking supersedes Moscow as the Communist Mecca? Is it Mao's China? Another essential will be to eschew blustering, elephantine political warfare of the type that fails to take into account the doctrinal divide between Moscow and Peking and serves the separate interests of both by compelling them to cling together. Only then can Western policy—particularly in the Near East and other political and strategic borderlands where it is already being left behind by local events—gain command of whatever new situations Malenkov's succession may create; only then can Western propaganda be concentrated on a single, clearly defined target instead of diffusely loosing off grapeshot at everything in sight.

# MALENKOV'S HUNDRED DAYS

**by Samuel L. Sharp**

THERE IS one undisputed fact about the regime established in the Soviet Union less than 24 hours after Stalin's death: it has survived the first 100 days without the major upheaval or collapse expected by some, though not without muted reverberations of what may one day erupt as a dramatic struggle for power. Beyond this, despite the categorical assertions by people who write as though they had just emerged from under the conference table in the Kremlin, it is remarkable how much we still do *not* know.

**To begin with:** what is Malenkov's own position in the regime that bears his name? All we know is that he has very ostentatiously relinquished the simultaneous hold on party and government which had characterized Stalin's position for more than a decade. Shortly after assuming the premiership, Malenkov resigned from the Secretariat of the party. But was it a voluntary decision or was it forced on him by a group of rivals determined to check any move that would tend to upset the tenuous balance? According to some, Malenkov believes in building up the machinery of government at the expense of the party. But what is there in his record to support such an assumption? He certainly made his career in and through the party apparatus, not in the government.

If we assume that Malenkov, though not the undisputed master is the leading figure among several groups, who then does he speak for? Isaac Deutscher groups him with the managerial group connected with the development and operation of the Soviet Union's steadily growing industrial power, a group that seems to believe that the primitive "magic" employed by Stalin in ruling Russia, the cautious and obstinate catering to symbols of Russia's past backwardness, are out of date and no longer necessary for the purpose of ruling a country that has entered the ranks of leading industrial powers. The speed with which the new regime has undone most of the organizational arrangements made only a few months earlier under Stalin's authority, the sudden halt called to the habit of quoting Stalin and his "work of genius" on practically everything, from philosophy to pig-raising—no doubt lend some support to the theory that the

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modern-minded heirs merely waited for the old despot's demise to begin the streamlining job. It is assumed, however, that the modernizing and reforming job encounters strong opposition somewhere at the top.

Is this then the story behind the smooth façade of the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov triumvirate, or the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov-Bulganin quadrumvirate? If the story is opposition to reform, where does it come from? A plausible guess would be that the secret police, which grew into a powerful state within the state under Stalin's benevolent eye, is opposed to any substantial relaxation of internal controls which might be expected to come as a corollary of reform and modernization of the Soviet state. The same elements may also be against a relaxation of external tensions which the reformers regard as necessary for the internal transition; their ally in this may be the army which for strategic reasons would be inclined to insist on the maintenance of far-flung outposts of Soviet power, deep in the heart of Europe, so as to make it possible to apply the traditional Russian doctrine of defense in depth.

Fascinating as such a guess is, it is not the only plausible one. Nothing illustrates better the amount of what one is tempted to call informed ignorance than the conflicting interpretation of the mystery of the so-called doctors' plot and its unexpected denouement. Again, all we know for certain is that the existence of such a plot was dramatically announced before Stalin's death and even more dramatically exploded as a fabrication shortly after his death. It is obvious that someone was out to get someone else, but who was after whose scalp? There is one element of agreement in the otherwise conflicting solutions to the riddle offered this side of the Iron Curtain: the discovery of the "plot" was somehow connected with a bid for the support of the army. The accused doctors, it will be recalled, were said to have plotted to eliminate a number of the leading military figures of the Soviet Union. The official communique also charged them with having eliminated the late Andrei Zhdanov and another Politburo member, Shcherbakov. But, quite significantly, the politicians listed as victims were dead ones, while the generals allegedly earmarked for elimination were still alive.

**This fact, examined** against the time-honored device of totalitarian regimes to create sympathy for leaders by "discovering" plots against their lives—a peculiar, but frequently used public-relations trick—gives substantial plausibility to the theory that there was a connection between the "plot" and attempts to build up the prestige of the military leaders or to seek an alliance with them. But there the clear path of evidence ends and speculation begins. Who was seeking to build up the army, for what purpose, and against whom? Franz Borkenau, long established as an authority on Communism, says without hesitation: "Malenkov was seeking the support of the army in his fight against the left-wing of the party," allegedly headed by Beria and Molotov. In the interpretation of the same event offered by Stalin's brilliant biographer, Isaac Deutscher, the roles are distributed in an entirely different manner. The plot, he says, was indeed engineered as a bid for army support, not by Malenkov, but rather against him and the "reformers." By building up the prestige of the military leaders, the police paved the way for a possible coup and the replacement of the party government by a military dictatorship.

**An interpretation** which occurred to this writer probably has little chance of being generally accepted, because it is too simple, but it is nevertheless offered here for what it is worth. The doctors' plot, it seems to me, was "discovered" in the expectation of a major crisis, perhaps as a result of Stalin's death. Under the circumstances, a "plot" would have been a ready explanation and a diversionary device. The crisis has not materialized because things were arranged quite smoothly after Stalin's death. Therefore the "plot" was simply called off. As always, officials below the top level were made to take the blame and, incidentally, the prestige of the new regime was enhanced by a demonstration of devotion to legality. The "plot" was possibly a bid to the army, but its calling off was certainly a bid to the people of Russia, an indirect pledge of the government to curb somewhat the unlimited power of the secret police. Other overtures were also made to the people and they should not be underestimated. A reduction of prices on consumer goods, the sale of flour on the free market, the amnesty, the promise to revise penal provisions of the many laws on the book, and the stress on the possibility of peace and therefore of more consumer goods—together with the change of the tone and content of the press in the direction of more news (including foreign news) and less stereotyped vituperations, are definite indications of an attempt to loosen the tight screw a few turns.

To the same category of moves to consolidate public opinion belongs the recent criticism of those who, taking their cue from Stalin's last work on economics, continued to plug the line which made it appear that the existing system of trade between town and countryside would be replaced, in the near future, by a Communist system of "product exchange" with complete elimination of money and trade. Of course, Stalin was not categorical about that and he said that the system must be introduced "without any particular hurry." But the present government apparently considers it important to stress that no such drastic change is contemplated, short

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of an "ideal organization" some time in the not now foreseeable future. This will no doubt reassure the peasantry.

In the field of international relations, the essence of the Soviet stand has undergone no major change. The importance of a settlement of the German problem is still stressed as issue Number One. It still seems correct to assume that the Soviet leaders are not merely out to break the solidarity of the Western alliance (though this in itself would constitute a major achievement and one not inconsistent with traditional aims of diplomacy), but appear ready to negotiate a settlement of the German problem, including withdrawal from Germany—for a price, of course. Their objection to being exposed to the test of preliminary "deeds, not words" as a precondition of a conference on Germany and other matters indicates that the Soviet Union continues to consider herself as a world power of the first order, whose international standing has not been impaired by Stalin's death. At the same time, the official Soviet pronouncements—for instance, the reaction to Churchill's mention of Locarno—in *Pravda* show a touchiness characteristic of Russian diplomacy in the past.

On the whole, the foreign-policy pronouncements and moves of what may after all be the Malenkov regime in essence and not in name only fail to convey the impression of a government in a state of panic. If the Russians are bluffing and are trying to conceal their extreme need for a relaxation of tension, if they have something else up their sleeve, it must be said that they are doing a very good job of camouflaging their true situation or their true intentions.

# THE FLAW IN WESTERN ALLIANCE

## I. THE SOVIET TRADE OFFENSIVE

**by Frank Gorrell**

POLAND'S annual production of steel was about one million tons before the war. It reached 3.2 million tons last year of which one-third came from the new Beirut factory at Czestochowa. The Polish Government is now carrying out a high-pressure campaign to hasten the completion of another plant at Nowa Huta, a new city of 100,000 workers near Cracow. The goal is production of nearly five million tons of steel in 1955.

By US production standards this is of course a mere drop in the bucket. Yet the fact that the Russian Government is now less concerned with heresy hunts or with economic spoliation than with expediting the delivery of machinery for Nowa Huta and other new steel plants in the satellite countries makes it a politically significant drop. Russia is also beginning to export machinery and other steel products to Western Europe. These include automobiles and motorcycles. During the early part of June about 100 Russian-made Moskovitch cars were shipped to Amsterdam. They were scheduled to be followed by several hundred more, Pobedas and Zims as well as Moskovitchs. Motorcycles of the UM type were also to be delivered.

By Detroit standards this is a trivial transaction. Yet the fact that payment is to be made in local currency is politically important at a time when dollar-poor Western Europeans are bitter about US trade policies. In addition the Russians are taking advantage of widespread doubts about GOP Washington's willingness to implement the principle of trade, not aid; they are trying to drum up two-way trade in places as far afield as South America and the Middle East.

These small indications of a new trend in Soviet policy are typical. One of the significant aspects of that trend is an effort to meet the implications of the world policy of a Washington administration apparently dominated by big business. The method is to play the same game—to emphasize industrial production more than propaganda, trade more than subversion.

And if the Communist bloc can convince Europe that it is not only willing but also capable of participating in genuine two-way trade, Malenkov will have the edge in that game, and that edge will be considerably sharpened if the emerging American policy of neither trade nor aid gains more than, for Europeans, the already disquieting support it enjoys.

**It seems to many** Western Europeans that Georgi Malenkov is far more steel-minded than was the Vozd whose chosen *nom-de-guerre* meant steel. He has a cold, practical awareness of the elements of power in the modern world whereas his predecessor had the weakness of concern with their theoretical and mystically symbolical derivations. In cold war and real war, and in peace too, Malenkov thinks in terms of steel production; of world trade; of the kind of diplomatic bargaining power than can be backed up only by possession of large numbers of the latest and best airplanes; and of the kind of fighting war in which not only atomic energy but also other scientific developments will count more than the whole, huge manpower reservoir of Russia and China.

In these terms Russia is still far behind the US. But the pace and the rhythm of progress are greater, faster.

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better than anywhere else in the world—except in West Germany. The practical fact which dominates the growth of modern power outside the US is the steady and rapid rise of industrial production in the Soviet world in West Germany. Naturally, therefore, the key to Russian policy is Germany.

Malenkov's good-will offensive is intended to delay, if not to prevent, either a Western European union or coalition, in which Germany would inevitably become the master, or an alliance between Germany and the US, which would make the West unconquerable. The purpose of the delay is to get the time to make the Soviet industrial empire, including an industrialized China, better able to hold its own in the steel war.

And the offensive has a political as well as an economic spearhead. Malenkov aims to prod the German dream of a united Germany into quickened life. A series of decrees in East Germany promises civil rights and the return of property to refugees, ration cards to citizens previously held politically unworthy, amnesty for "economic criminals," an end to farm collectivization, and the granting of state bank credits to private businessmen. More important than all these, perhaps, is the joint declaration of reconciliation issued by the government and the powerful Protestant church. Religious youth groups will no longer be persecuted, the cases of upward of 100 jailed pastors will be reviewed, and confiscated church property will be returned.

Malenkov is in the market to buy time because, as the Manchester *Guardian* points out, "The American intention is to make the Ruhr once again into the greatest arsenal of Europe, in the interest of Western defense," and "the Germans believe that they can very soon overhaul the Western nations which now have a big start." But the Russian technocrat is in a position to do some hard bargaining because there are strong forces in some of these nations, notably Britain and France, that are worried both about the rapid rise of German power and about the willingness of big-business elements in their own countries to help it, without getting guarantees about its eventual political and military use.

**A French group** of big businessmen, including the de Wendel group, the largest producer of steel in France, recently bought from the Friedrich Flix group of Germany a controlling interest in seven Ruhr coal mines producing 6.5 million tons annually. The de Wendels (who did business with the von Wendels during World War I) already control an output of four million tons of Ruhr coal. By the new purchase, French big business controls 7.5 percent of the Ruhr production out of a total of 9.6 percent belonging to non-Germans.

Bit by bit other German properties are expected to pass into the hands of similar non-German groups. Altogether a total of about 1,000 million marks is involved. Much of this money is to be invested in foreign countries, especially France. The significance of this potential renewal of the de Wendel-von Wendel pattern is suggested by the *Figaro* of Paris, which speaks with authority for the kind of French big business which inherits the traditions of the *Comite des Forges*. It is learned from a German source, says the newspaper, that the money will give the Germans a share in the French airplane and aluminum industries. Part of the reason, according to the *Figaro* is that these industries are not nationalized in France; a greater part is that "the agreements on the end of the occupation regime in West Germany still forbid airplane manufacture on German soil." One thing is certain: "the present negotiations between Dusseldorf and Paris must not be the last."

It is to put a crimp in such big-business deals that the Russians want to talk big diplomatic business about Germany by less big but more numerous Frenchmen and Englishmen who, while willing to accept controlled German military rearmament, are worried about uncontrolled German industrial rearmament. Many of these objectors are willing to let Theodor Blank build up a West German Ministry of Defense behind the transparent screen of the "Office for Questions Arising from the Accomodation of Allied Troops in Germany." After all, sooner or later, West Germany must have an army.

**There is more concern,** however, about the activities of Friedrich Jastrow's "Association for the Development of Air-Transport." It is not certain that such men as Willy Messerschmitt, Ernst Heinkel and others like Siebel and Dornier who built Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe should have a free hand in the development of aviation. For Heinkel, at present producing Vespa motor-scooters at Stuttgart, has already been "negotiating" with Egypt and Middle Eastern countries. And Messerschmitt has taken time off from building prefabricated houses to open offices in Madrid and select a staff of experienced technicians to work for him in Spain. Friedrich Seewald at the reopened "Aviation Research Institute" in Essen is coordinating the latest ideas and inventions in the whole field of heavy industry for the benefit of the emergent German aviation industry.

By US standards all this activity—and potential activity—may be relatively small stuff. But the "shadow" German airplane industry—a civilian industry already interested in guided missiles—is beginning to cast a long political shadow. And if the "what is good for us is good for the free world" doctrine of Krupp, Thyssen, Pferdmenges and their French counterparts is allowed to get airborne without challenge, only Malenkov's big business will profit.

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## II. THE AMERICAN TARIFF RETREAT

by Tom Fitzsimmons

THE HIGH-TARIFF lobby is always among the strongest in Washington. After 20 years of frustration under Democratic administrations, it was to be expected that protectionists would celebrate the coming of the Republicans by joining money and talent into the best co-ordinated and most effective pressure group to hit the Capitol in a decade. What could not be anticipated was that Eisenhower, at the very moment when Russia is attempting to split the Western alliance on the issue of trade, would become the willing or unwilling instrument of economic isolationists whose every victory makes East-West trade more attractive to Europe.

**Last October,** Adlai Stevenson warned, "It is not possible for this nation to be at once politically internationalist and economically isolationist. . . . But this is exactly what the Republican leadership has long been doing and what it would do, I believe, if it should again come into power." But Eisenhower repeatedly committed himself to a trade policy realistically reflecting our position as the foremost creditor nation in the world. And he was believed. Even liberals took comfort. Had not Eisenhower's experience in Europe given him a first-hand knowledge of the economic dilemma of the Free World?

Yet, during his first months in office, the President took two steps which encouraged high-tariff advocates to believe they could rebuild the old Smoot-Hawley wall more quickly than they had dared hope. (1) Instead of requesting a new law making "trade not aid" really possible, he asked only that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, under which 80 percent of his power to lower tariffs has already been exhausted, be extended for one year without change. And (2) he appointed to key posts two men opposed to free trade, Joseph E. Talbot to the Tariff Commission and Felix E. Wormser to be Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

Eisenhower has been known as a keen judge of men and a master at forming smooth-working teams. On April 2, he gave Talbot an interim appointment to the Tariff Commission. As a Congressman, Talbot had been an outspoken protectionist. House rollcalls show him voting to cut by 50 percent the President's power to lower tariffs and against extension of the Trade Agreements Act.

During the Senate Committee hearing on his appointment to the Commission, Talbot was asked if he favored making the "peril point and the recommendations of the Tariff Commission mandatory upon the President?" "I feel they should be," said Talbot. Such an inroad upon the President's power would constitute a major and fundamental change in the act, one Eisenhower had declared he would not accept.

Yet subsequently Eisenhower changed the interim appointment Talbot had first been given to a full-term one.

Eisenhower named Felix E. Wormser, another outspoken and active supporter of high protective tariffs, as Assistant Secretary of Interior in charge of mineral resources. Wormser, executive vice-president of the St. Joseph Lead Company, largest producer and smelter of lead in the US, had been president of the Lead Industries Association which has always carried the fight to keep other nations out of the US market.

Asked by a Senate Committee if he favored special tariff protection for the lead and zinc industry, Wormser said "Yes." He was then asked if such special protection "will increase the price of lead?" "It is specifically designed to increase the domestic price," answered Wormser. Then, "do you think you can take over the duties fairly and impartially in view of your pre-conceived ideas on this subject as they conflict with the views of the President?" "Yes, sir," said Wormser.

These appointments, of course, heartened the protectionists who had descended upon Washington early in the year to form three new, large pressure-groups bound together by interlocking membership. They were further encouraged as the weeks went by and the Administration failed to send down a trade bill incorporating its policy. **Finally,** Rep. Richard Simpson (Pa.), who for years has mouthed the views of the American Tariff League and protectionist coal mine operators in his district, introduced a bill which one Administration spokesman described as "cutting the heart out of present trade policy." O. R. Strackbein, a life-long protectionist who had helped administer the Smoot-Hawley tariff under Hoover and now the leader of the combined lobby, praised the bill. It was, he said, "written by a legislative draftsman, but his ideas came from industry."

**During the first** three months of this year, Strackbein and the pro-high tariff organizations he represents reported under the Lobby Act receiving $36,831.59 from the industry which supplied the ideas for Simpson's bill. Those ideas, as they appeared in the bill, include changing the Tariff Commission from the non-partisan-fact-finding body it has been for nearly forty years to a purely partisan group; making its recommendations binding upon the President, as Talbot had urged; loosening the conditions under which the "escape clause" and "peril-point" provi-

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sions can be invoked; and establishing special protective barriers to the import not only of lead and zinc, as Wormser had advised, but also of residual fuel oil, which competes with domestic coal and gasoline.

The protectionists never hoped to win all the provisions of the Simpson bill on the first try. But they thought such a bludgeon bill might frighten the Administration into further compromises. Events proved them right.

**When the Administration** trade bill was finally introduced, Chairman Daniel Reed of the House Ways and Means Committee promptly pigeonholed it and scheduled hearings on the Simpson bill instead. The high-tariff advocates, the only ones invited, appeared first and got the biggest headlines. Lobbyist Strackbein was present at each hearing and personally coached many of the witnesses. The bill seemed to have powerful backing.

The scare tactic worked. Ready to compromise, the President personally promised Simpson that future Tariff Commissioners would be more protectionist-minded, and that he would not negotiate any other trade agreements for at least a year, or until he received the results of a special study of our foreign economic policy.

So Simpson split his bill and introduced two new ones. The first, approved by Eisenhower, contained further compromise. While extending the Trade Act, it changed the Tariff Commission to a partisan body, and outlined work for the special study commission which could not be properly done in the time allowed.

With at least this much change virtually assured, the protectionists now look forward to three more years under Eisenhower in which to push through the second Simpson bill, that is, all the provisions left out of the "compromise" bill. And they are confident. They feel that although the President does such things as turn down a Tariff Commission recommendation for higher tariffs on Japanese silk scarves, he has, through compromise, hopelessly weakened his defense against Congressional usurpation of his powers over trade policy.

In *The Lobbyists*, Karl Schriftgiesser notes that "lobbying flourishes most . . . when the executive is weak." Under Eisenhower it has become weak. And we can probably expect the exact opposite of what happened when another man whose party had been out of power for two decades was elected President.

Shortly after the election of Woodrow Wilson, the special interests went to work on his first major piece of legislation, the Underwood Tariff Bill of 1913.

But Wilson, who saw protectionism as one of the chief reasons why the American Government had for decades been a government of special interests, knew the lobbies. He had devoted himself as his first task after election to studying their aims, and their methods.

On May 16, 1913, he ordered them out. He told them to get out of Washington and allow Congress to proceed with its task. The capital emptied. The trade act passed.

But Eisenhower, politically innocent before he became President, seems not to know the lobbies. If he had studied them he would have pondered facts such as these:

O. R. Strackbein, founder of the newly-formed pressure group which calls itself the Nationwide Committee of Industry, Agriculture and Labor on Import-Export Policy, and ex-Rep. Tom Pickett, chief of another—the Foreign Oil Policy Committee—are both Texans. Both are keenly aware of the oil-man's horror, for example, of competing with low-cost residual fuel oil from Venezuela. Representative Simpson, on the other hand, is a Pennsylvanian. He represents a district whose economy depends upon small farms and industries which rely largely on exports and which, consequently, fear any action which might cause foreign retaliatory import restrictions. There is, however, in this district, a declining, small-mines coal industry which is hard put to compete with cheaper fuels, either foreign or domestic. Oil-wise Tom Pickett now is also vice-president of the National Coal Association. The curb on imports of fuel in the Simpson bill was reportedly based on a draft prepared in the offices of the National Coal Association.

**That Eisenhower still** is ignorant of the lobby system is indicated by a recurrent report that Strackbein is to be offered a place on the Tariff Commission.

Eisenhower also seems to overlook the connection between the successes of the lobbies and our needs to conserve US oil resources while encouraging the development of those in Venezuela, the largest Western reserve; Venezuela's need for sales to develop those resources, and her consequent interest in Communist-bloc trade offers as the US succumbs to the protectionists.

In Europe, the short-sighted greed of some big-business interests helps Russia's efforts to deny the West the potential industrial strength of Germany. In the US some big-business interests and their lobbyists aid the Russian effort to split the Western alliance by forcing European nations to become economically independent of inconsistent, vacillating US trade policies.

Recently a group of French businessmen returned from Moscow demanding that their government revoke the ban on East-West trade in strategic materials because they had found lucrative markets for machine-tools, trucks, steel, etc. Continuing Administration compromise with special interests in the US will increase the frequency and the power of such demands in Europe. Already Western alliance is strained; if the economic flaw in the structure is not repaired, it will crumble.

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# LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

## THE SACK AND ENSLAVEMENT OF THE MIND: TWO VIEWS

### The Intelligent Devil

**by Henry Bamford Parkes**

FOR A REAL understanding of totalitarianism, one needs the kind of imaginative insight which can be supplied only by a creative artist. One book like *The Captive Mind* is therefore worth dozens of sociological analyses. Its author is a young Polish poet who lived in Warsaw through the Nazi occupation, entered the diplomatic service of the postwar Polish government before it had become fully Communist, and after a long *crise de conscience* finally broke with the new regime and went into exile in Paris in 1951.

His book deals with the problems of the intellectual in the so-called people's democracies, as exemplified in his own experiences and in those of four leading Polish writers who, for different reasons, have surrendered to Communism. Admirably translated by Jane Zielonko, it is a vivid and sensitive record of heart-breaking events, and is the more effective because Mr. Milosz never takes himself too seriously or loses his sense of humor.

The most striking feature of *The Captive Mind* is that the debate between Communism and freedom is presented as primarily a spiritual and intellectual conflict between opposing systems of ideas. Mr. Milosz does not condemn Communism by any of those pragmatic tests which are normally applied by Americans. He is totally indifferent to the relative economic merits of private enterprise and government planning and not particularly concerned even with the political question of democracy versus dictatorship. Communism appears as a comprehensive view of life purporting to have the solution for every intellectual problem. For several years Mr. Milosz almost succumbed to it, and he does not judge too harshly those Polish writers who have become Communist propagandists, but is anxious to explain why they submitted. He emphasizes partly the effects of Communist control of all the media of opinion, so that any alternative view of life soon began to seem unreal, and partly the immense prestige and material rewards offered to intellectuals who would serve the new regime, as contrasted with the poverty and obscurity of exile. What brought him to his own breaking-point was neither the political nor the economic policy of the dictatorship but the realization that if he accepted the Communist philosophy, he would be false to his own sense of vocation as a writer. He went into exile when he was ordered to write in accordance with the tenets of socialist realism.

Mr. Milosz is the product of a tradition of civilization in which philosophy and poetry are still regarded as important occupations with social responsibilities. Although he refrains from any direct criticism of the United States, his book suggests some disturbing reflections about the image which American society presents of itself to European intellectuals. For such men the United States can justify itself only by representing ideas more valid than those of Communism and by showing greater respect for spiritual values. If it stands only for material power and prosperity, it can have little positive appeal for European intellectuals, though insofar as it at least refrains from regimenting its artists, it may appear, when contrasted with the Soviet Union, as the lesser evil.

Usually [says Mr. Milosz] what is strong in the West is purely negative. . . . Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot.

THE CAPTIVE MIND, by Czeslaw Milosz (Knopf; $3.50).

### The Predatory Jailer

**by Stephen Spender**

CZESLAW MILOSZ broke with the present Polish government when he was Cultural Attaché to the Polish Embassy in Paris, in 1951. He lives now in Paris, having been prevented by immigration laws from entering the United States, there to join his wife and children. Milosz has a face which gives the impression of width, pale blue eyes, like those in a painting of some peasant by Modigliani. He talks slowly, and in a peculiar grinding way, as though every sentence is minted by some internal process, before it leaves his mouth.

*The Captive Mind* is a masterpiece. It portrays a philosophy in action which has already captured half the world, the Polish people, in the grip of this philosophy and, indirectly, our present day intellectual world. Most of the book is an argument developed with admirable concreteness: there is the bite of Milosz's teeth in every word. This argument blossoms out into descriptions, portraits, asides, and at the end into a chapter of noble eloquence, commemorating the Baltic peoples. And, as it were, out of the entrails of his relentless seriousness, Milosz lets fall devastating pieces of irony, piercing witticisms. I am sure that in a hundred years people will read this passionate apologia, which conveys the most intense feeling of an age. More important, though, is that it should be read immediately.

Milosz's main purpose is to explain how the Communists succeed in enslaving the minds of the intelligentsia, and how important an aspect of their programme this is. With the Poles, they did it by a technique of encouragement, cutting away the ground of the old life of the intellectuals from under their feet, providing them with a new and unknown audience of workers, tempting them with power, filling them with fear of the sterility from which they would suffer if they were deprived of the

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"stream of history" which Communist governments supply and completely control.

Milosz compares the process of indoctrination of the intellectuals by Stalinism to the Murti-Bing pills which are described in a fantastic novel by Witkiewicz, published some years before the war:

> The Murti-Bing "philosophy of life," which constituted the strength of the Sino-Mongolian army, was contained in pills in an extremely condensed form. A man who used these pills changed completely. He became serene and happy. The problems he had struggled with until then suddenly appeared to be superficial and unimportant.

This is the first stage of the Marxist transformation—accomplished of course, in Poland, in an atmosphere where the intellectuals sincerely felt that Communism offered the only hope. The last stage is Ketman, when everyone is afraid of denunciation by everyone else, and life has become a ceaseless play in which he is both actor and audience, and deceiving and observing and being observed by his neighbors from morn until night of every day. Ketman is the most elaborate of all games in this society, when behind a screen of simulated orthodoxy, you escape into a private life which is a mixture of cynicism and escape. If you are a writer, you withdraw behind your virtuous pronouncements into writing children's books, studying the classics, or translating approved of works.

After introducing us to Murti-Bingi and Ketman, Milosz devotes four chapters to biographies of four Polish writers, Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta. Alpha is a man of high moral principles, first of all a supporter of the Right, a Catholic, then, during the war, a heroic leader of the underground movement, and lastly one of the most privileged writers used to attack the Vatican, under the Communists. Beta, the disappointed lover of humanity, embraced the New Faith which would save humanity by force; but finally he committed suicide. Only Gamma, the slave

*(Continued on page 23)*

## "A CURIOUS SENSE OF DIRT"

**by Perry Miller**

EVEN were these the letters of a writer of the twenties whose entire work had worn as thin as has most of Anderson's, they would be enough to establish him anew as a major figure. They challenge not only the psychologist but all concerned with the endless problem of the artist in America. But coming from the author of *Winesburg, Ohio* and of the enduring short stories, they are both a document for the century and a revelation of the creative mentality; they belong with the distinguished body of attestation which historically must be appended to *The Confessions* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

LETTERS OF SHERWOOD ANDERSON, edited by Howard Mumford Jones and Walter B. Rideout (Little, Brown; $6).

Here are four hundred out of the five thousand letters collected in the Newberry Library; the editors have culled those which pertain to the writer and specifically disclaim attempting an epistolary biography. For this we may thank them, as also for their copious assistance of the reader through discrete annotations. The selection begins in 1916, ignoring what survives of Anderson the businessman who, as Mr. Jones says, was "a quite different fellow."

Over the years 1916-1941 Anderson harped now on one theme, now on another; but when we view the letters as whole, as constituting in the words of Mr. Jones virtually a posthumous novel, we see them as successive efforts to push in every conceivable direction, to the delimiting circumference, the various facets of Anderson's single and obsessing perception.

The center of this configuration, they make astonishingly clear, was the conception "clean." By the time he turned to writing, he was a man who, in his own judgment, had been defiled. He had smeared himself by seeking money, success, security; yet his repentance was for something even deeper and more insidious—it was a revulsion against the contamination of foul thoughts, of images and day-dreams. When visitors to his room—a small, simple one, in which he worked—have told dirty stories, the stench clings to the wallpaper. He takes care to assure his friends that though the hotel in which he is staying (he loved to write in hotels; they were "impersonal") is full of whores, he has never, not ever, gone to a prostitute. At the heart of the man was a fanatical fastidiousness, an abhorrence of the slightest taint of corruption, such as to the ordinary sensual man will seem pathological and which may well appear excessive even to those who profess belief in the doctrine of innate depravity.

This uncleanliness had become by 1916, and increasingly became thereafter, that "self" from which he sought deliverance with the passion of a medieval flagellant. But the Christian pathway was not open to him; instead, there was only that tortuous way which Rousseau left to his spiritual posterity. Rousseau learned the value of subjective gratification when his loved schoolmistress whipped him, and thereafter kept himself in torment by imaginative profanations of every pretty women he saw. This curious taste, he says, carried to the point of depravity and even frenzy, "preserved my morality." So he could strike the austere Kant as the master-moralist of the age because he stripped masks from a false civilization; for essentially the same reason, Anderson tore away the pretenses of Winesburg to expose the quivering uncleanliness of a festering selfhood.

This self can escape only if purified, and purity for modern America requires such a reconstitution of a masculine fraternity as will strengthen the manhood of the nation to cope both with the matriarchy and with the machine. Symbolic of that "pretty damn sweet male world" is the thoroughbred horse, who is "clean." The threat is the machine, which "in separating men from tools and materials, does make for male impotence." In this situation, the woman cries for things, security; and so nations lose their morality. Sinclair Lewis and the hard-boiled cynics do not strike at the disease, but by yielding to it, augment it. We remember the boy and the trainer in *I Want To Know Why* who exchange before the race a glance of manly understanding which assures the victory, but in the evening Jerry Tillford goes to "the tall rotten looking woman" and brags as no decent horse would ever do. Huck Finn in modern dress asks why a man who knew as much as did Jerry Tillford "could see a horse like

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Sunstreak run, and kiss a woman like that the same day." "In my book," Anderson explains to Georgia O'Keefe, "I wanted to represent a man simply as struggling to escape that feel of dirt."

The lay analyst wants to theorize about Anderson's complexes, but the editors, in their deliberate selection, point to a more important question. They let Anderson emphatically prove that he was so far above the critics who called him vague and groping that he could look down upon them from a great height in pity. That he laid himself open to ridicule and that the satire hurt is painfully evident; but out of his neurosis he projected a strangely coherent diagnosis of this civilization. The reader of these letters is obliged to pay it a new respect. The issue, he was saying in 1935, is not between Communism and capitalism "but between this obsession with fact and the other conception of in some way recreating the pathway between men." Creative man, working in the fact, in the machine, finds that the creativity which he intended to be a help for others has ended in "hurt."

Anderson constantly says that he has no mind, and certainly he could never have written the essays of T. S. Eliot; but he had, one may argue, in his comprehension of the Waste Land, an amplitude which no theology can match. In his fidelity to his sense of its manifold ironies ("Perhaps," he says in 1930, "there will be a new, gaudy romantic movement. I'd welcome it") his is a voice, here raised most effectively and engagingly, against all constrictive solutions.

**Anderson may have** been the victim of some physical, sexual, or psychic wound. He was obviously weak, and he scurried frantically for protection. But whatever the root of his psychosis, however oblique the expression, even though he took refuge in mere incantation and repetition, and can be charged with obscurantism or infantilism, the total result is an exalted honesty. His assertion of manhood and comradeship, like Whitman's, cannot be dismissed as aberration; it abides in the field of ideas, and above all of ideas in America. These letters are fascinating and disturbing, for we must say of him, as again of Rousseau, that the man was greater than his books. Hence he appears here for what he was, a judgment upon men and ultimately upon society.

## GRAPPLING GOLIATH

GIANT BUSINESS, by T. K. Quinn (Exposition; $3.75).

HOW SHOULD LIBERALS regard the giants of American industry and finance—the motor and steel companies, the commercial banks and life insurance companies—which dominate the economic scene and bid fair to control our political life as well? In the past, liberals have embraced the small business unit, the family, and the limited government. In this century, this Jeffersonian strand has found its ablest expositors in Woodrow Wilson and Justice Brandeis. But, increasingly, this point of view has lost popularity in the face of seemingly inevitable growth in the size of business, labor, farm, and governmental units. And progressives have found themselves torn between fear of business influence and admiration for the achievements of giant industry.

Perhaps it is natural then that rationalizations of the situation have appeared which minimize the dangers and emphasize the benefits of large size. It was a pragmatic American who said that if you can't beat them, join them. The leading theorist of this school is Mr. Galbraith who has argued most brilliantly in *American Capitalism* that large business organizations encounter "countervailing" pressures from other large business units (General Motors counterbalances United States Steel, Sears Roebuck, the Goodrich Tire Company, Macy's, and so forth) and from three non-business groups; labor, farmers, and government, each of which has organized itself in order to curtail big business' ability to exploit through the exercise of market power. Thus, wherever economic power arises, checks to it appear. And, in this best of democracies, we may enjoy the economic fruits of mass production, while we avoid its threat to our freedoms.

In this climate of opinion, Mr. Quinn's book strikes a quaintly archaic note. It is the story of a self-made, self-educated man who rose to the Vice-Presidency of one of our largest business monsters, General Electric, and then on the very threshhold of selection as its President, reflected, and, reflecting, resigned his position. So amazed were his superiors that it took them five months to believe him.

Why did he abandon an organization in which he had risen so high and could rise still higher? This very attractive, pugnacious, and unconventional book catalogues its author's motives. They amount to an indictment of General Electric and, by extension, big business. General Electric was a niggardly employer, unenlightened and treacherous in its dealings with its own distributors, unfair to its scientists, and medieval in its conception of social responsibility. It crushed the personalities of its employees and gave little latitude to its executives. Thus, the greatest sin of giant business as exemplified by General Electric was against the soul of every human being who worked for it.

Mr. Quinn will not concede to big business even the advantages of efficiency often admitted by the severest critics. To him the apparent successes of large scale industry are the fruits of enormous capital resources, expensive advertising, and, above all, the acquisition of smaller, more efficient competitors. The large research laboratories of American industry only lead Mr. Quinn to observe that the inventor is a lonely person who when confined among his fellows, retaliates by inventing nothing at all. We have Mr. Quinn's word for it that the only invention that General Electric has produced in its own laboratories is the garbage grinder.

What shall we do to defeat big business? Mr. Galbraith's cheerful analysis pleases our author not at all, for Mr. Quinn dislikes elephantiasis in labor and in government as much as in industry. His solution, never systematically presented, includes at a minimum federal incorporation acts, rigid enforcement of anti-trust statutes, and dissolution of monster enterprises. This done, competition will return and business will become again an attractive career for a free man.

It may be that this reviewer, lacking Mr. Quinn's strength of character, has been carried along too far by current opinion. At any rate the principal emotion aroused by this book is nostalgia rather than agreement. Mr. Quinn's world sounds very pleasant, but even if his economics and statistics were more convincing than they are, what are the prospects of achieving it at a time when big business and big government are in such happy unanimity at the expense of the rest of us? There is something to be said, no doubt, for a gallant fight in a lost cause. We may wish Mr. Quinn luck, for his cause is good as well as lost.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

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## MESSAGES AND SAGAS

THE IDOLS AND THE PREY, by John Goodwin (Harper; $3.50). A GOOD MAN, by Jefferson Young (Bobbs-Merrill; $3). GO TELL IT ON THE MOUNTAIN, by James Baldwin (Knopf; $3.50).

THE IDOLS AND THE PREY tells a story we have all heard before: how white men degenerate in the tropics, here the island of Haiti. Negro or half-cast vitality and amorality either break the "civilized" white man or they convert him. Both instances are shown here—Hugh Cannery, an elderly aristocratic Bostonian, succumbs to drunkenness and to the control of a gigantic and monstrously energetic half-caste woman; Boyd Knowles, a maladjusted artist, "goes native," engages in Vodoo rites, and ends in disaster. Throughout, the author tries to maintain an atmosphere of total decadence and depravity in his account of the natives and their rather bizarre habits, but somehow it all seems like an exhibition of "local color," and the vision of evil never takes shape. At the end, when the sodden, broken Cannery is taken off in his own boat by his conquerors we somehow feel like we do at the end of a Fitzpatrick technicolor travelogue: "As we sail off into the sunset, leaving the beautiful island of Haiti with its fascinating customs . . ."

*A Good Man* is a white man's sympathetic account of a Negro's desire for status. "Prince" Albert, a strong, simple Southern laborer, has an obsession to paint his shack "white." This ingenuous but highly symbolic gesture is tacitly encouraged by the white man who owns the property but is vigorously discouraged by all the other whites of the community and, out of fear, by Albert's fellow Negroes. The action ends in failure but not in the death of hope.

*A Good Man* is told with spare economy and utter simplicity, and consists largely of accurate, it would seem, evocation of Southern Negro dialect, interspersed with brief, objective bits of exposition. And its aim is as simple as its style and structure: an unmawkish tribute to a "good man." If the novel has any oblique "message" about the Negro question, that message is the same as Faulkner's, "Sometime, but not yet." Still *A Good Man* is another instance of one of the emerging paradoxes of our time, namely that many young Southern writers have a new folk hero, the Negro, and a new myth, the Negro's endurance and integrity. Thus the very trait that the Babylonian captivity evoked, the only quality that could have saved the Negro in the post-bellum South—endurance—is now being celebrated with some of the fervor that used to go into romanticizing the old plantation. If, as Ezra Pound said, artists are the antennae of the race, then the denouement of the drama of the South will have an ending utterly unforeseen in any of the many and conflicting scripts that have been written for it.

*Go Tell It On The Mountain* is an attempt by a Negro to write a novel about Negroes which is yet not a "Negro novel." "I wanted," he says, "my people to be people first, Negroes almost incidentally." In this he is eminently successful, yet, paradoxically, he at the same time manages to convey more of the essential story of the American Negro than do most avowedly historical or hortatory books on the subject. Though the time is the twentieth century, the locale the North, and the protagonist a boy of our time, the author by invading the memories of elder generations manages to cover the major parts of the great grim saga, guilt-ridden and blood stained, whose end is not yet written but whose horror, pathos, and muffled triumphs have written themselves indelibly on even the most unthinking elements of the national consciousness. Slavery days, the post-bellum South, the classic ghetto of the North, Harlem, are all conjured up. There are the excessive interests in, the enormous energy expended upon, the only two outlets allowed: religion and sexuality; and the interrelated yet divergent extremes for conduct: a narrow Baptist morality and a Bacchanalian free-wheeling—a sin obsessed minister blindly coupling with a servant girl upon a kitchen floor. But the saga of the race is mainly background for the developing consciousness of John Grimes, a shy, sensitive boy who tries to preserve his personality from the onslaughts of his rigid, fiery father who, by proxy, stands for the hostile world with which the boy must eventually deal. Through a climactic and concluding religious experience he finally finds a standing-ground. *Go Tell It On The Mountain* is impressive not only for its psychology and saga, but for its construction, which employs a skillful time-shift, and for a style rich in metaphor and in a sad eloquence.

JOHN HENRY RALEIGH

## PENSEES AND CLICHES

BOOKS IN GENERAL, by V. S. Pritchett (Harcourt, Brace; $3.50). PEOPLE, PLACES AND BOOKS, by Gilbert Highet (Oxford; $3.50).

THE ESSAYS which make up Mr. Pritchett's *Books in General* show him to be one of the best critics writing in English. This book has a future. I can foresee that it will soon appear on lists and that English majors in our colleges will have it prescribed to them as a "set book." This is the price excellence pays. Mr. Pritchett's pages are full of delightful surprises—of insight, judgment, and real wisdom. His style is his own, dense but not tortured, the *netteté* of the best French critical writing without its categorical over-simplifications. You dare not skip a line for fear that you may lose the definitive phrase or the sentence which ties everything up securely. Several of the essays can justly be called definitive. I know none better on T. E. Lawrence, Zola, Maupassant, Tolstoy, Poe, Clough, Meredith, or Koestler (also a superb diagnosis of the sickness of our time).

One is tempted to review *Books in General* by quoting the *pensées* of Pritchett and then signing off. T. E. Lawrence is fixed as "the kind of man of action who did not value what men of action valued." The difference between Henry James' method of working up his subject and Hawthorne's is acutely defined in this wise: "What strikes us is how much James's notes were used. Hawthorne's long notes seem to have been a studied alternative to his real subject." Speaking of Daudet, Pritchett makes a telling distinction between French and English fiction:

> It appears to be impossible for the English writer to treat love as an idea in itself, to confine himself to the meteorology of the emotion, to believe that it can be thought of as a climate in itself to which every other consideration must be, for the time being, subservient.

Is it not true of the Victorians that they "considered energy was its own justification for it led inevitably to progress"? In the piece on Meredith (in my judgment the most penetrating of these thirty-four essays) Mr. Pritchett sows such aphorisms with a prodigal hand. Meredith, he says, "lived off the hyperbolical. Even the worst, dullest, the flattest things had to be cooked in hyperbole."

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One of the reasons why Mr. Pritchett is so good (perhaps it is the chief reason) is that he cares deeply about the human spirit and values the way it struggles, in every age, against the assaults of decivilization. To him the writer is hero because he knows the moral scheme of things. His view of faith is not theatrical. His is the civilized, the believing and creating mind. What he creates deserves the minutest and most generous consideration from society because what he creates is indispensable.

Taking up Professor Highet's *People, Places and Books* after finishing *Books in General* is rather like pouring yourself a glass of blended spirits after a diet of bonded bourbon. These collected radio talks are reported to have been highly successful, but as they appear now on the printed page they say little that is memorable. They condescend and explain too much, in a jolly "you-and-I-know" tone. Professor Highet is a master of the disguised cliché. He is at his best when he is writing about the man behind the book—Henry Fowler of *Modern English Usage*, for example—or when he evokes a place he loves—Oxford or the American Far West (though for some reason, ignorance perhaps, he believes that only a few fine books about the West have been written). Occasionally he forgets that he is coaxing the primary grade into loving literature and indulges in sharp and thorough criticism. I have not seen, for instance, a better statement of some of the false assumptions which underlie the Great Books idea or a shrewder analysis of Christopher Fry's deficiencies as a playwright or a more informative essay on the art of translation as practiced in our time. Perhaps we should take these pieces for what they are, plain talks for people, and not demand anything more of them. But the printed page is a great revealer of vacuity, and there are, it must be confessed, some empty pages in *People, Places and Books.*

WILLARD THORP

## INSIDE YOUR HEAD

THE LIVING BRAIN, by W. Grey Walter (Norton; $3.95).

BRITISH SCIENTISTS, for whatever reason, seem to write better than their American opposite numbers. In the fairly special matter of the physiology of the brain, for example, I can think of at least three eminent British authorities all of whom have produced readable books for laymen: J. Z. Young, E. D. Adrian, and, of course, the late Sir Charles Sherrington. To these names must now be added a fourth. Dr. W. Grey Walter of the Burden Neurological Institute at Bristol is an authority on electroencephalography, editor of the *International EEG Journal,* but he writes like a skilled journalist, and you need no special knowledge to understand and enjoy his book.

The physiology of the central nervous system is so enormously complex that as Dr. Walter remarks, no one student or team can hope to explore all its phases. In view of his own specialty, it is not surprising that he gives most of his book to the recurring electrical impulses which sweep through the gray matter. There are many of these, but Dr. Walter limits himself chiefly to the four that are most strongly marked, called alpha, beta, delta and theta. He believes that certain characteristics of some of these electrical rhythms are associated with certain types of personality, and that useful lessons regarding human conduct can be drawn from these variations.

In some people the alpha rhythm tends to disappear when the eyes are open and the mind is at work—for example, while doing a sum in mental arithmetic. In others it is remarkably persistent, while a third group shows no significant alpha rhythm at all. Members of the first of these groups (two-thirds of the population) are both visually and orally minded, and can combine these two types of mental activity to produce satisfactory results. The second group, in whom the alpha rhythm is persistent, is excessively oral-minded; its members (one-sixth of the population) almost never use visual images. Conversely, those who have hardly any alpha rhythms (also one-sixth of the population) are excessively visual-minded, so much so that they have difficulty in performing mental tasks which cannot be translated into imaginary pictures. Dr. Walter suggests that a marriage between an individual in the second group and one in the third is likely to have a stormy course and that negotiations between any two individuals might sometimes fail because of the incompatibility of their brain waves, and so on. Although he reports that no correlation has been established between the brain rhythms and the common types of mental disease, he says it is possible to detect in childhood patterns which are associated, years later, with moral irresponsibility, so that the individual might commit a meaningless murder.

These brain waves are all a sort of flicker; alpha rhythms range from eight to thirteen cycles per second, deltas from half a cycle to 3.5 per second. Some abnormal mental states can be produced by artificial flicker seen out of the corner of the eye—for instance, in a motion-picture theatre with the head turned partly away from the screen, or while driving an automobile rapidly along a road bordered by trees, at a right angle to the almost level rays of the sun. Dr. Walter tells of an individual in a movie house who felt in himself a murderous impulse when his head was turned so that the flicker of light on the screen was seen from the side (the author ignores the possibility that the badness of the movie might have been responsible). He suggests that most of us may have become inoculated against such impulses by having experienced this flicker repeatedly.

The first section of this book is a description of the evolution of the brain so far as it is known, which is very little. There is a huge unexplained gap between the brain of man and that of the most highly developed of his simian cousins. For that matter, there are scores of huge unexplained gaps, at every stage in evolution—including that between the brains of the ameba and the jellyfish. In this phase of science, as in many others, what we don't know bulks hugely larger than what we do.

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## AN ENGLISH VIEW

THE AMERICAN ROAD TO WORLD PEACE. by Sir Alfred Zimmern (Dutton; $4.).

SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN, professor emeritus of international relations in the University of Oxford, who is now living in the United States, has behind him a lifework of studies and activities devoted to League of Nations and the United Nations. His latest book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with what might be called the background of the United States and Europe, and then in a more detailed way with the twenty years of the League of Nations between the two wars, the second discussing the United Nations and the need of American leadership in it.

Rarely has a book been written, by a non-American, in a spirit as friendly to the American people as the present is. "All over the world men and women *sense* that America represents something new and attractive which haunts them in contrast with their present condition." Because the Americans have experienced the benefits of a good constitution of their own, they seem best qualified to take the lead in the constant improvement of the broader constitution needed to ensure world peace.

Sir Alfred is highly critical of the Security Council of the United Nations which has done little to organize security, a task which has been taken over, at least partly, by the General Assembly and by the regional bodies set up under Article 51 of the Charter. The unsatisfactory state of things in the present United Nations is attributed by Sir Alfred to the lack of a true United Nations executive. In its absence, too much responsibility has been thrown upon a single government, that of the United States, and many nations "have not yet brought themselves to trust the American government and people or to recognize that the central place on the political stage of the world is now occupied by a great power of a type different from that of its European predecessors and representing new principles and new standards of conduct in international relationships."

The proposals to amend the United Nations Charter which Sir Alfred makes, to be put before the Revising Assembly, are less interesting than the general spirit of optimism which permeates the book. The author believes that an understanding of the United States and its motives, on the part of the other nations of the world, would be the best insurance for peace, and he is confident that in fifty years' time the Soviet Union will be a historic memory. Looking back at the tremendous changes in the organization and the map of the world, which have occurred during the last fifty years, who could contend that there is no foundation to Sir Alfred's optimistic outlook?

HANS KOHN

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*(Spender, continued from page 19)*

of History, is thoroughly unsympathetic of these four. But in the three other cases, the reader can understand that it was a compulsion stronger than fear which made these men accept Communism. Basically it was because the Communists have reduced everything to terms of their actions, behavior and ideology. Communism is the air one breathes, the food one eats, the subject one writes about and the audience who reads, in that part of the world (which is half the world).

Any view of life based on the premises of *The Captive Mind* would be as despairing as George Orwell's in *1984*. But Milosz is by no means without hope. Although the people of Eastern Europe live in a mental world which is a closed circle of Marxism explaining every phenomenon, the Communists do not completely understand how to overcome human nature.

One reason why every intellectual should read this book is that it will make him ask what the West has to show against all this. The surrender of the intellectuals in Poland was largely due to the fact that when the Communist work had become a *fait accompli*, their past values had no answer to the Communist philosophy beheld in all its power and glory. The Poles of course, had already been betrayed by the West and had good reason for trying to cooperate with the East. But with all our superior advantages, what answer would we have tomorrow if the entire conditions of our lives were transformed into a Workers' Republic and we were asked to take sides with inevitable History? Un-American activities committees, and the McCarran Act (which has kept the author of this book—the most powerful exposure of these Communist methods—out of the United States) would certainly not be the answer. But would *The Cocktail Party?* Or *A Streetcar Named Desire?* Or *The Age of Anxiety?* Or the novels of Graham, Henry or Julian Green(e)? I suspect that most of these works could be adroitly used to provide arguments against poetic Cocktails, Streetcars called by such odd names, and to offer us an Age without Anxiety. It seems to me that the only faith that can immediately and finally answer Communism is an almost primitive type of Christianity, based on a profound sense of the individuality of each man and woman. But until we have a society which regards the rights of each human life as sacred, that too might be dismissed as a delusion.

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